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been enacted for the protection of those the legislature has determined are incapable of granting legal consent to particular acts involving their person. 29
Even though one may not necessarily agree with the court in the present case,
it must be acknowledged that the court is handicapped in its effort to bring about

just results by an archaic, and in many instances poorly drafted, Penal Code.3 0
Particularly in need of revision is the section dealing with rape. As is apparent
from the particular facts of the principal case, 3 ' the interpretation of the pertinent
code sections formerly accepted by the court can easily bring about unsatisfactory
resluts. 32 This situation is disturbing, not only because of the heavy penal consequence,3 3 but also because of the embarrassment and loss of reputation which
necessarily results from a conviction of statutory rape. However, the fact that
the law in this area is in urgent need of change does not necessitate the abandonment of the sound rule in regard to mistake as to the female's age or other
incapacity to give legal consent.34
It should now be even more clear to the legislature that the statutes concerning rape must be revised and clarified, but until this is accomplished it is hoped
that the court will-not be induced to bring about such changes by further judicial
legislation.
Donald F. Powell*
in the State Prison not exceeding five years, and a fine not exceeding one thousand
dollars." CAL. PEr. CoDE § 267. In People v. Dolan, 96 Cal. 315, 31 Pac. 107 (1892),

the court rejected the defense that the defendant had a reasonable belief that the female
involved
was over eighteen years of age.
29
Another example of such a statute is CAL. PEN. CODE § 288, which makes it a
felony for one to commit any lewd or lascivious act on or with the body of a child under
the age of fourteen years.
30 See Packer, The Case for Revision of the Penal Code, 13 STAN. L. REv. 252
(1961).
31 See note 10 supra.

32 "Under the statute the girl may be the older and more aggressive of the two,
and the real seducer... She may be a common prostitute and seduce a boy of fifteen,
and yet in such case the boy is guilty of a felony, while to her the law awards no
punishment." People v. Derbert, 138 Cal. 467, 469, 71 Pac. 564 (1903).
3 Statutory rape carries a possible maximum of fifty years. CAL. PxR. CODE § 264.

34
See Perkins, Alignment of Sanction with Culpable Conduct, 49 IowA L. REv.
325, 381 (1964).
* Member, Third Year Class.

COURT-APPOINTED COUNSEL-RIGHT
TO COMPENSATION
Court-appointed counsel representing indigent defendants in criminal proceedings have been held not entitled to compensation for their efforts or expenses'
1Ruckenbrod v. Mullins, 102 Utah 548, 133 P.2d 325 (1943); Annot., 144 A.L.R.
839 (1943); CooLEY, CONSTrrUTioNAr LsrrATbONs 477 (7th ed. 1903). Contra, Knox
County Council v. State, 217 Ind. 493, 29 N.E.2d 405 (1940).
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in the absence of statute.2 In a departure from precedent, Dillon v. United States3
awarded compensation to an attorney for representing an indigent criminal
defendant. Final outcome of the case is still in doubt pending an appeal, 4 but the
lower court's decision is noteworthy for the strong argument it makes against the
usual position taken by the courts in this type of case.
Dillon held that when a United States court appoints counsel to represent an
indigent in federal criminal proceedings, 5 where right to counsel is mandatory, the
United States is liable to the attorney for the reasonable value of his services and
his expenses. The foundation of the decision is the fifth amendment proscription
against taking private property for public use without just compensation. The
court had to decide three main issues in reaching its decision: (1) whether it bad
authority to order the United States to pay just compensation for the taking of
private property in the absence of channels provided by Congress; (2) whether
an attorney's license, time, expertise, physical resources, and expenses constitute
property within the meaning of the fifth amendment; (3) whether the order
appointing an attorney to represent an indigent in criminal proceedings is a compensable appropriation of private property for public use.
The court ruled that it was authorized, without specific legislation by Congress,
to order the United States to make payment for property appropriated by an
officer of the United States. Federal district courts are vested by statute with
jurisdiction to adjudicate claims against the United States founded upon the
Constitution or upon an express or implied contract with the United States. 6 In
addition to citing the statute, the court relied on case authority which bad awarded
compensation on the basis of "an implied contract, or the black-and-white premise
of a judicial implementation of the self-executing exigencies of the fifth amendment. . . ."7 Under the implied contract reasoning it is held that when an officer
of the United States, acting with authority, appropriates property for the public
use, the court will imply a promise on behalf of the government to pay for the
property. 8 On the other hand, using the self-executing provisions of the fifth
amendment, the court does not rely on fictions. It declares a violation of the fifth
2 Nabb v. United States, 1 Ct. Cl. 173 (1864); Ruckenbrod v. Mullins, 102 Utah
548, 133 P.2d 325 (1943); Pardee v. Salt Lake County, 39 Utah 482, 118 Pac. 182
(1911).
S230 F. Supp. 487 (D. Ore. 1964).
4Appeal docketed, No. 19629, 9th Cir., Oct. 19, 1964.
5

Counsel in Dillon was appointed to represent defendant in 28 U.S.C. § 2255
(1958) proceedings. These proceedings are designed by Congress to streamline the
method of seeking relief on constitutional grounds from judgment and sentence. The
proceedings are classified as civil in nature, Martin v. United States, 273 F.2d 775 (10th
Cir. 1960), but "realistically, a proceeding which may result in vacating a criminal
proceeding is, at least, not purely civil." Dillon v. United States, 307 F.2d 445, 447 n.3
(9th Cir. 1962).

628 U.S.C. § 1346 (1958).

7 Dillon v. United States, 230 F. Supp. 487, 492 (D. Ore. 1964).
SCampbell v. United States, 266 U.S. 368 (1924) (taking of land gave rise to

implied promise to pay); United States v. Lynah, 188 U.S. 445 (1903) (submerging
land by dam gave rise to implied promise to pay); United States v. Berdan Fire-Arms
Mfg. Co., 156 U.S. 552 (1894) (consensual use of patented fire-arm device resulted in
implied contract); United States v. Palmer, 128 U.S. 262 (1888) (consensual use of
inventor's infantry equipment gave rise to implied contract).
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amendment and orders compensation. 9 Both methods of reasoning arrive at the
same result, and the court in Dillon found it unnecessary to decide between the two.
It used both as authority for its decision.
The court experienced little difficulty in finding that the work-product of an
attorney was property within the meaning of the fifth amendment. An analogy
was drawn to the work-product of an inventor. When an inventor invests his time,
expertise, and mental and physical resources in creating an idea which is patentable, he is held to have a property right. That property right may not be appropriated by the government-without compensation.o The Dillon case found no
distinction between this and the work-product of an attorney and held that "if the
work-product of an inventor . . . be compensable property, so is the workproduct of a lawyer, and his office expenses and out-of-pocket money are such,
per se."" l
Finally, the court determined that ordering an attorney to defend an indigent
in criminal proceedings is a "taking" of property for public use within the meaning of the fifth amendment. It reasoned that if the appropriation of an inventor's
work-product is an appropriation of compensable property, the ordering of an
attorney "to give of his services under his license and of his office facilities and
money" must also be an appropriation of compensable property. 12 Further, it is a
taking for the public use. Under the doctrine enunciated in Douglas v. California'3 an indigent is entitled to counsel on appeal, as well as in the lower court,
and the Dillon court said that "no longer should the 'some people' in the legal
profession bear . . . the cost and expense of the . . . organic obligation of the

sovereign" 14 to furnish counsel. Since Dillon was an appointment of counsel to
fulfill the organic obligation of the United States, the appointment was necessarily
for the public use.
One major obstacle the court had to overcome in reaching its decision was a
factor which many courts in the past had used as a basis for denying compensation to court-appointed counsel. 15 Earlier courts had said that the practice of law
was a privilege, exercisable at the discretion of the court.' 6 In accepting the
privilege an attorney became an officer of the court, but he took his office cum
onere. One of the duties was an obligation to assist the court in administering
9 Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40 (1960) (taking of boats on which workman had liens violated fifth amendment).
1oUnited States v. Berdan Fire-Arms Mfg. Co., 156 U.S. 552 (1894); United
States v. Palmer, 128 U.S. 262 (1888).
"1230 F. Supp. at 492.
12 Id. at 493.
13372 U.S. 353 (1963).
14 230 F. Supp. at 493.
15 Nabb v. United States, 1 Ct. Cl. 173 (1864); Rowe v. Yuba County, 17 Cal. 61'
(1862); Ruckenbrod v. Mullins, 102 Utah 548, 133 P.2d 325 (1943).
16 Ex parte Lockwood, 154 U.S. 116 (1893), held that the right to practice law
was purely in the discretion of the court before whom the lawyer would practice and
that since the right to practice was not a privilege or immunity of citizens of the United
States, the Supreme Court could not inquire into the exercise of that discretion. But cf.
Konigsberg v. State Bar, 353 U.S. 252 (1957), holding that the right to practice law
cannot be withheld without due process, by implication overruling the result in Lock-

wood.
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justice.7 In filfilling this obligation the attorney was required to represent indigents in criminal cases when appointed, and he could neither reject his appointment without cause nor demand compensation.1 8 This theory was held to nullify
any claim of deprivation of property as well as any implied contract claim.' 9
Ruckenbrod v. Mullins,20 a leading case stating this theory, said that if an attorney had a right to practice, and not merely a privilege, then the attorney would
be able to claim a deprivation of a property right without compensation. Dillon
seized this point 2 ' and cited two Supreme Court cases holding that admission to
the bar could not be denied without due process of law. 22 The practice of law,
Dillon held, was no longer a mere privilege.
The importance of Dillon has been diminished with respect to federal cases by
the enactment of the Criminal Justice Act of 1964.23 This act provides for the
compensation of counsel representing indigents, as well as for the representation
of indigents in federal criminal cases. 24 Thus, whatever the ultimate disposition
of Dillon, counsel will henceforth receive compensation on the basis of statute.2 5
However, there is still a substantial area of indigent defense work being performed by uncompensated counsel in state criminal proceedings.26 If the reasoning in Dillon can be extended to cover such representation, the case could take on
another significance.
17 COOLEy, CONSrrrUTIONAL LMFFATIONS

477 (7th ed. 1903).

Is Rowe v. Yuba County, 17 Cal. 61 (1862); 2 HoLDswoRTH, HIsTonY

OF ENGLISH

491 (3d ed. 1923). Cf., "A lawyer assigned as counsel for an indigent prisoner
ought not to ask to be excused for any trivial reason, and should always exert his best
efforts in his behalf." ABA, CANONS OF PaoFEsSIoNAL ETncs Canon 4 (1908).
19 Nabb v. United States, 1 Ct. Cl. 173 (1864); Ruckenbrod v. Mullins, 102 Utah
548, 233 P.2d 325 (1943).
20 102 Utah 548, 233 P.2d 325 (1943).
2
l Although Dillon does not cite Ruckenbrod.
22
Konigsberg v. State Bar, 353 U.S. 252 (1957); Schware v. Board of Bar
Examiners, 353 U.S. 232 (1957).
23 Pub. L. No. 455, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. (Aug. 20, 1964).
24 The statute requires that each district court shall, with the approval of the
judicial conference for that circuit, place in operation one of the following three plans:
(1) representation by private attorneys; (2) representation by attorneys furnished by
the bar association or other agency; (3) representation by a plan combining all or parts
of the two above.
Compensation is to be rendered at the rate of fifteen dollars per hour for in-court
work, and ten dollars for out-of-court work, with a maximum of five hundred dollars for
felonies and three hundred dollars for misdeameanors. Compensation will also be
rendered for reasonable expenses incurred, and additional money will be available for
experts and investigational services. Payment in excess of the maximum is authorized
under extraordinary circumstances. Ibid.
25 Dillon expresses the opinion that the Criminal Justice Act of 1964 would not
cover 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1958) proceedings. But the language of the act, construed
broadly, would seem to cover such a situation. "[Alt any stage of the proceedings, including an appeal, the court having jurisdiction ... may appoint counsel. . . and
authorize
payment... "' Ibid.
2
6 Fifteen states make no provision for compensation of court-appointed counsel,
even in major felony cases, and eight of these states do not provide compensation in
capital cases. SPEciAL Com
rnrzzE
OF THE NEw YoRK Crry Bn Ass'N and the NATIONAL
LAW

LEGAL Am AND D=NDER Ass'N, EQUAL JusTicE FoR THE AccusED Appendix (1959).
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The fourteenth amendment prohibition against taking property without due
process is said to include the fifth amendment prohibition against taking property
without just compensation.2 7 If Dillon is correct in finding that the work-product
of an attorney is property within the meaning of the fifth amendment and that the
ordering of an attorney to defend an indigent is an appropriation of that property,
it would seem that the reasoning of the case would apply equally to state court
proceedings.
If states are required to follow Dillon there will be two desirable results. The
first is that the quality of representation of the indigent will be improved. Unpaid
counsel often provides a poor defense when contrasted with the defense compensated counsel can provide for his client.28 This occurs for a number of reasons, and

often in spite of the best intentions of counsel. Unpaid counsel must seek his
compensation elsewhere. Consequently the indigent's case wil suffer while
counsel endeavors to fulfill his obligations to paying clients. He may also attempt
to dispose of his indigent client's case as rapidly as possible so he can devote his
efforts to earning his livelihood.2 9 He cannot afford to expend his own personnel
funds for investigation in depth, searching out and rounding up facts and witnesses.30 One commentator summed up the problem: "[T]o phrase it from the
indigent defendant's point of view, you don't get much for nothing."81 Certainly
compensated counsel will be able to prepare a more adequate defense and con32
tribute to more equal justice for indigent defendants.
The second desirable result of applying Dillon to state proceedings would be
the correction of the hardships worked on the legal profession by the requirement
of service without remuneration. Frequently the attorney appointed by the court
to represent an indigent is relatively new to the practice of law.3 3 To require him
to practice without compensation is often to endanger his career. Examples of this
usually follow the pattern of indebtedness,3 4 direct out-of-pocket loss, closed
27
28

Chicago, B. & Q.R.R. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1897).
Hannah, Equal Protection-Factor Fiction, 21 LEGAL Am BBIF

CAsE 56 (1962);
Kadish & Kimball, Legal Representation of the Indigent in Criminal Cases in Utah, 4
UTAH L. REv. 198, 230 (1954).
29
SPEcL&n Co~mff rr
OF = NEw Yonx CrrY BAR Ass'N ANm = NATIONAL
LEGAL Am AND D? NDErt ASS'N, EQUAL JusTcE FOR THE AccusED 67 (1959).
3
0 Mazor, The Right To Be Provided Counsel: Variations on a Familiar Theme, 9
UTAH L. REv. 50, 82 (1964).
81 Bennett, A Prison Directofs Views on the Public Defender, 21 LEGAL Am Bumm

CASE 44, 46 (1962).
32 If defendant with paid counsel is receiving better representation than the defend-

ant with uncompensated counsel, it would seem that the statement in Douglas v.
California, 372 U.S. 353, 357 (1963), that "there can be no equal justice where the kind
of appeal a man enjoys 'depends on the kind of money he has' . . ." might be aptly
applied. The Supreme Court has never ruled on whether representation by uncompensated counsel is a denial of equal protection.
33
Ervin, Uncompensated Counsel: They Do Not Meet the Constitutional Mandate,

49 A.B.A.J. 435, 436 (1963);

REPORT OF SPECIAL ComianTrxx ON DEFENSE OF INMICENT
PEmsONS AcCusED OF CuME JonqrLY WrrH E
STANDING CO1IMrrEE ON LEGAL Am

Wonix, 88 A.B.A. REP. 255 (1963).
3
4 Dillon v. United States, 230 F. Supp. at 495 cites personal knowledge of two
young court-appointed attorneys who had to borrow money to maintain themselves
during a lengthy trial.
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offices, 85 and even impairment of professional reputation caused by not being able
to adequately investigate the client's case and consequently appearing to have
handled it badly.3 6
The logic of the holding, the better representation of indigent defendants, and
the relief of hardships to the legal profession all seem to require an affirmance
of Dillon and an extension of the rule of the case to state criminal proceedings.
Jack Komar*
85 Defects in Assigned Counsel System, 21 LEAL Am BRIEF CASE 78, 80-81
(1962); Ervin, Uncompensated Counsel: They Do Not Meet the ConstitutionalMandate,
49 A.B.AJ. 435, 436 (1963).
26 Defects in Assigned Counsel System, 21 LEGAL Am B=uF CAsE 78, 79 (1962).
* Member, Third Year Class.

